Abstract-Smart meters are integral to demand response in emerging smart grids, by reporting the electricity consumption of users to serve application needs. But reporting real-time usage information for individual households raises privacy concerns. Existing techniques to guarantee differential privacy (DP) of smart meter users either are not fault tolerant or achieve (possibly partial) fault tolerance at high communication overheads. In this paper, we propose a fault-tolerant protocol for smart metering that can handle general communication failures while ensuring DP with significantly improved efficiency and lower errors compared with the state of the art. Our protocol handles fail-stop faults proactively by using a novel design of future ciphertexts, and distributes trust among the smart meters by sharing secret keys among them. We prove the DP properties of our protocol and analyze its advantages in fault tolerance, accuracy, and communication efficiency relative to competing techniques. We illustrate our analysis by simulations driven by real-world traces of electricity consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
T HE traditional power grid has a supply-follows-demand usage model. Demand-response (DR) in emerging smart grids holds promise for a demand-follows-supply alternative [3] , which has broad implications including (i) economically efficient electricity consumption in which elastic demand at peak times is shifted to off-peak periods when supply is much less expensive, and (ii) integration of intermittent green energy sources (such as solar and wind) by managing demand on-line to match fluctuating supply levels. By reporting essential load information for key control decisions (e.g., how much load to shed or shift when and where), smart metering is a critical enabling technology for DR to succeed. Smart meters report consumption for users at high frequency (e.g., once per minute) and in real time. This level of monitoring can reveal much private information about the users and subject them to various undesirable outcomes [16] , [23] , e.g., whether they use the exercise room much (discriminating pricing of health insurance), if they watch TV a lot (predatory advertising), or even stealthy surveillance in general [11] . Public outcry about privacy has led to the banning of smart meters in North American cities [30] , and derailed a planned mandatory deployment of smart meters in the Netherlands [12] . Where they are still deployed, users must now consent to opting in voluntarily. It is clear that users will not opt in if the privacy implications of doing so remain unclear.
In this paper, we aim to remove critical privacy barriers for users to participate in DR, so that current advances in smart grid technologies can fulfill their true promise of economic and social impact. Our specific aim is to provide strong privacy assurance for users who contribute their consumption data to aggregators managing DR programs. We adopt differential privacy (DP) [8] as the privacy notion because as an information-theoretic measure, it is independent of any attack methods or indeed any assumed computational limitations of the adversary. It is also a strong notion that guarantees the privacy of any single value in a dataset even if the adversary knows all the other values.
DP is a privacy approach of much current interest [9] , [19] and its use in DR aggregation protocols is mainly characterized by the need to distribute the noise for privacy protection among smart meters which report to the aggregator [1] , [5] , [24] , [27] . Certain of the prior aggregation protocols are not fault tolerant [24] , [27] , meaning that they will fail if some participating meter(s) fails to report. This presents clear difficulties in practical deployments, since smart meters, as inexpensive home devices in unprotected environments, are unreliable, and their communication typically occurs over unreliable network channels as well. It is unacceptable that the unavailability of isolated parts of the network will prevent the operation of the DR program as a whole.
To achieve fault tolerance in aggregation protocols, there are two possible approaches: reactive and proactive. A reactive protocol learns about failures after-the-fact and initiates recovery actions from them afterwards. A state-of-the-art reactive protocol [1] achieves small errors in spite of failures, but it requires multiple rounds of message exchanges between the smart meters and aggregator, which increases the required network bandwidth and delay. More importantly, the protocol is tolerant of partial failures only.
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. [1] , [24] , [27] . It has the same fault tolerance as [5] , but much reduced errors and bandwidth overheads (see Section IV-C for details). It also requires uni-directional communication only when smart meters report to the aggregator. Our protocol uses modular addition-based encryption, which is much more efficient than homomorphic or exponentiation-based encryption.
We now give a succinct account of how the reactive protocol in [1] can fail under communication failures. A basis of the protocol is that it distributes noise for privacy and keys for message encryption among the meters, which report their respective shares to the aggregator. When the aggregator sums up the reported values, the noise should add up to that required for differential privacy, and the keys must sum to zero. For fault tolerance, the meters have set up prior partnership agreements with each other, so that two partners share each other's keys. The protocol works as follows (see [1] for details). In round one, the meters report. In round two, the aggregator broadcasts to all the meters an id list of the meters who did not report (i.e., failed). In round three, a working meter, say , who is a partner of a failed meter, say , reports 's key on behalf of . It is clear that if either round two or three fails, the keys do not cancel out and the aggregation fails.
In a proactive protocol, smart meters send redundant information in anticipation of faults. Should a fault occur actually, the needed information for recovery is already available, which reduces the recovery time significantly. Indeed, a proactive protocol may handle failures using one (unidirectional) communication step from the working meters to the aggregator only [5] .
The state-of-the-art proactive protocol, the binary protocol [5] , suffers from several important practical problems, however. First, the binary protocol sends redundant information for proactive recovery as a binary interval tree encoding of the meters, which has bandwidth cost even in normal operation (i.e., no failures). Hence, it achieves low delay at the expense of high bandwidth (if , the bandwidth cost is 12 times). Second, its bandwidth cost for supporting meter join/leave is linear in . Since can be quite large in practice, the overhead is of concern in dynamic environments where there are non-negligible churns of participants for reasons such as meters turned on and off, plugged in and unplugged, or failing and recovering. Third, the error of the protocol grows with as well (see Table I ). A large error will compromise the effectiveness of the demand response. For example, if an aggregator uses inexact aggregate consumption to determine real-time electricity prices, the prices may not be fair or truly market-efficient.
In order to protect privacy, researchers have also proposed the use of battery to moderate household energy usage [13] , [14] , [18] , [29] , [31] , and this approach is generally known as battery-based load hiding (BLH). The advantage of this approach is that meters do not need to share any secret with each other, so that the failure of a single meter will not affect the aggregator from getting the readings of the remaining meters. However, most of the BLH approaches proposed [13] , [14] , [18] , [29] do not satisfy differential privacy. It is unclear how to quantify the privacy protection provided by these approaches when DP is not satisfied. Zhao et al. [31] proposed the only DP-satisfying BLH algorithm. However, this algorithm only satisfies the weaker -differential privacy [10] , meaning the -DP guarantee can be violated for fraction of time. Moreover, in order to have reasonable -DP guarantee, the algorithm requires the battery to be of large storage size that is too expensive to be practical currently.
In this paper, our main contribution is the design, privacy analysis, error analysis, and complexity analysis of a proactive fault-tolerant aggregation protocol for privacy-assured demandresponse.
• Compared with the state-of-the-art protocol in reactive fault tolerance [1] , ours is significantly more efficient in supporting meter join. Although it sends redundant information for proactive recovery, in steady-state normal operation (i.e., no failures), the redundancy is only one future ciphertext (see Section IV-C), whose presence doubles the message size, per time slot. In comparison, the reactive protocol does not increase the message size, but it requires three messages per slot, compared with one in the proposed protocol. Hence, our protocol is more bandwidth-efficient, by about 50%. More importantly, our protocol is fully resilient against communication failures, whereas the protocol in [1] is not as we discussed.
• Compared with a state-of-the-art binary protocol [5] , our protocol has the same level of fault tolerance. However, our protocol (i) is significantly more efficient in normal operation (constant bandwidth vs. ), (ii) is significantly more efficient in supporting meter join/leave (constant bandwidth vs. linear in ), and (iii) has significantly reduced error which grows with the number of failed meters only, but not (Table I) . Table I compares our protocol with major related protocols in the literature, in terms of fault tolerance, communication complexity (bandwidth cost), communication model, and error.
Our other contributions are as follows. We present how the division of a privacy budget in our protocol can be optimized to minimize the aggregation error (i.e., the RMSE defined in Section IV-E), and show how the error can be reduced further by a notion of individual sensitivity. Furthermore, we present simulation results based on real-world traces of electricity consumption in the U.K. and Singapore to illustrate the performance of the proposed protocol and its improvements over the binary protocol in real-world environments.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We adopt differential privacy (DP) [8] as our privacy definition. For background, we discuss its meaning, noise generation techniques, and composition properties.
A. Differential Privacy
Definition 1: ( -differential privacy) A randomized algorithm is -differentially private if for any two datasets and that differ on a single element, and for all ,
A differentially private algorithm provides privacy because, given any two datasets which differ on a single element only, respective results of a same query on the datasets are not distinguishable. Therefore, an adversary cannot infer the value of any single element in the dataset. Here, represents the level of privacy. A smaller value of means better privacy, but it also implies lower accuracy of the query result.
B. Differential Privacy via Laplace Noise
Dwork [8] In smart metering, is the electricity consumption of say a household, so is the maximum amount that any one household can consume over any reporting period. is also called the noise scale. A random variable that follows the Laplace distribution has standard deviation and expected absolute deviation . As a result, the smaller is, the noisier the outputs and hence the higher the level of privacy guaranteed.
C. Distributed Laplacian Noise Generation
In demand-response (DR) smart metering, if there are adversaries against the privacy of participating users, each meter should generate shares of random noise in a distributed manner. Dwork et al. [10] show that Gaussian noise provides -DP, where is the probability that the loss of privacy is not bounded by . In [27] , each meter adds Laplace noise probabilistically to achieve -DP. Alternatively, [1] makes use of the infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution to achieve -DP. It is known that the Laplace distribution can be assembled from the sum of i.i.d. gamma distributions [15] .
Infinite divisibility of Laplace distribution [15 where is the Gamma function evaluated at . In our case, if the number of smart meters in an aggregation group is , each smart meter, say , adds to its consumption data before reporting. Then the sum of the reported data is given by Therefore, -differential privacy is provided.
D. Composability
The composition of differentially private algorithms also provides differential privacy, but it produces different results depending on the data to which the queries are applied.
Sequential composition [20, Theorem 3] Let each provide -differential privacy. The sequence of provides -differential privacy. Parallel composition [20, Theorem 4] Let each provide -differential privacy. Let be arbitrary disjoint subsets of the input domain . The sequence of provides -differential privacy.
In other words, if we run an -DP algorithm times on a dataset , the result becomes -differentially private. However, if we run an -DP algorithm times on disjoint subsets of the dataset , the result remains -differentially private.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION

A. Problem Definition
We assume that in a DR deployment, there are smart meters and one aggregator. Each smart meter, say , measures its electricity consumption in each time slot , and sends it to the aggregator at the end of the time slot. The aggregator only needs to know , i.e., the total power consumption in , in order to control the demand response, e.g., reduce peak loads of the power grid or match the aggregate consumption to available supply. The aggregator does not need to know the electricity consumption of individual users, and we aim to protect this private information from possible privacy attacks by a "curious" aggregator. To do so, we need to design a differentially private protocol to aggregate the electricity consumption reported by individual smart meters in real time. We seek the following desirable features for the protocol.
• Privacy protection with small errors. The protocol should allow the aggregator to know the total electricity consumption of users with little loss of accuracy to ensure the performance of the demand response, while protecting the privacy of individual consumption data.
• Cost effectiveness. Smart meters are home devices that must have low cost, either for consumer adoption or for utility companies to pay for them at large scales. As such, their computing power is limited. Therefore, the protocol should have low computational requirements at the meters. Similarly, the protocol should have low communication overheads and bandwidth requirements, to reduce the cost of the supporting network infrastructure.
• Scalability. The communication overhead of the protocol should remain small even if the number of participating smart meters is big in large-scale deployments.
• Fault tolerance. As low-cost devices running in unprotected environments, smart meters are prone to failures. Transient or longer-term communication failures are also not uncommon, due to say network congestions, routing changes, and faulty network connections. Therefore, the protocol should be tolerant of device and communication failures (fail-stop faults), so that the DR program may remain operational as a whole even if parts of the infrastructure should become unavailable.
B. Trust Model
In this paper, we consider a semi-honest (honest-but-curious) trust model [1] , [5] , [24] , [27] . The aggregator is untrusted in that a curious aggregator may try to compromise someone's private information through the aggregation protocol. A small fraction of the smart meters may collude with the curious aggregator. Smart meters will in general hide the information they have before reporting it to the aggregator. To assist the curious aggregator, however, colluders may deviate from the protocol by providing their own information in the clear to the aggregator. In general, the aggregator will follow the prescribed protocol, except that a curious aggregator may try to exploit illegitimate information provided by colluders.
C. Network Model
We assume that smart meters have a bi-directional communication channel with the aggregator. These smart meters can exchange encrypted messages among themselves over multi-hop end-to-end secure channels without going through the aggregator. We further assume that the smart meters are organized as a peer-to-peer (p2p) network using an existing protocol such as Chord [28] . They will use the p2p network to locate neighbors for secret sharing. Although the communication links between smart meters and the aggregator are fairly reliable, loss of communication may still happen occasionally. Of course, we may also lose communication if the source of the communication, i.e., a smart meter, fails. We refer to the loss of communication as a communication failure, whether the problem is with the meter or the communication channel.
IV. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS
A. Initial Setup
Each smart meter is configured with a private key and embedded with a corresponding certificate issued by a certification authority. The certificates are issued by trusted manufacturers when they produce the meters. When a new meter joins the network, it sends its certificate to the aggregator. The aggregator assigns identification numbers sequentially for all the smart meters as they join. After registering a new meter that joined, the aggregator broadcasts the new meter's id, as well as the (possibly changed) maximum id , so that every meter knows . We assume that meter ids are reused once their old owners left the system and their associated keys expired, so that is approximately equal to the total number of smart meters participating in the protocol.
After a new meter, say , obtained its id from the aggregator, it registers this id and its address and certificate with a trusted third party. It then requests the address of a random meter from the trusted third party as the entry point for it to join the p2p network. 1 The entry point helps the new meter locate itself inside the p2p network, by linking it with the required successor and predecessor nodes.
Once the new meter joined the p2p network, it randomly selects other meters as its partners for secret sharing, locates them, and retrieves their certificates (public keys) from the network. The smart meter may further verify the received certificates with the trusted third party. Here, is a system parameter that should be large enough so that the probability that all the partners of are colluders is negligible. We assume that the partnering smart meters establish secure channels directly based on public key encryption without going through the aggregator for key exchange. For instance, for each partner meter, say , chooses a random number to be the encryption key that it shares with , and sends the shared key to . With this approach to establishing neighbor relationships, the aggregator cannot identify these relationships among the meters.
To avoid the case that many meters select (randomly) the same meter as partner and hence share secret keys with it, which strains 's local memory to store the keys, each meter will only accept shared keys from at most other meters, where is a small constant and . After this limit is reached, the meter will refuse to accept more partners. In general, meter will try to select another meter as a new partner if (i) sent a partner request to an original meter but either refuses or does not get an acknowledgment from , or (ii) an existing partner of 's, say , leaves the system (see Section IV-C).
B. Secure Aggregation Without Fault Tolerance
In this section we describe how a meter reports its readings to the aggregator in a secure way. As an initial step, a smart meter, say , calculates , where is its consumption in time slot , and are i.i.d. random variables with gamma density, and the sum of the random variables from all the meters guarantees differential privacy, due to the infinite divisibility of the Laplace distribution stated in Section II-C. 2 However, by itself is not enough to ensure the privacy of meter because the noise of may not perturb sufficiently [1] . As a result, should be encrypted as a ciphertext before being sent to the aggregator--the aggregator can only decrypt the sum of ciphertexts from all the meters but not the individual ciphertexts. We adopt modular addition-based encryption. This is because a smart meter has limited computing power and modular addition-based encryption is significantly faster than exponentiation-based encryption. Moreover, modular addition-based encryption produces smaller ciphertexts in general, and it has been shown that modular addition provides perfect security [4] .
In the encryption step, a meter, say , encrypts by adding a random number . The random number is formed from component random numbers generated by a secure pseudo random number generator with the meter's shared keys as seeds. Specifically, where denotes the set of partners chose and denotes the set of partners that chose . Note that the encryption uses the sum operation because it is addition-based. Also, is a global and public time slot number that increases after every reporting time interval of consumption. Since changes at every time slot, also changes at every time slot. Note that since in is equal to in and they cancel out in the summation performed by the aggregator. Smart meter then sends as a ciphertext to the aggregator.
If the aggregator receives all the ciphertexts, it can calculate the aggregated sum as follows:
This protocol satisfies -differential privacy due to . If we assume that a fraction of the smart meters are colluders in that they supply clear information without adding the prescribed gamma noise, then each smart meter adopts instead of . This protocol is in fact an all-or-nothing protocol since if the aggregator fails to receive one or more ciphertexts from the meters, it cannot obtain any useful information because the sum of will not be zero. Notice that although modular addition provides perfect security [4] , the protocol presented so far does not achieve the notion of aggregator obliviousness [27] completely. In particular, the aggregator in the protocol does not participate in the encryption process. Hence, the aggregator capability, i.e., knowledge of the aggregator's private key, has no effect in protecting users' data.
In order to achieve aggregator obliviousness, we now further require that every meter is a partner of the aggregator, i.e., the aggregator always sends a key to each meter, denoted by for meter , and the key is always accepted and used in every reporting period by the meter. The private key of the aggregator is then given by , and the aggregator can obtain the aggregated sum by computing . Without the aggregator capability, the adversary knows only , an encrypted noisy sum of all the smart meter readings.
Theorem 1: Our protocol achieves aggregator obliviousness [27] . In particular, it achieves the goals that
• The aggregator can learn only the noisy sum for each period and nothing more.
• Even if the aggregator colludes with a subset of the participants, the aggregator only learns the sum of the remaining participants but no additional information.
• Without knowing the aggregator capability, one learns nothing about the encrypted data. Proof: We follow the proof structure outlined in [27] , namely the use of an aggregator oblivious (AO) security game. The game has two players, the challenger and the adversary. It consists of three phases: The first phase is setup, in which the challenger sets up the game and passes the game parameters to the adversary. In this phase, the adversary executes a sequence of actions each of which is chosen from: (i) Encrypt, in which the adversary queries for the ciphertext of a plaintext encrypted by a specific participant; (ii) Compromise, in which the adversary asks for the secret keys of specific participants; or (iii) Challenge, in which the adversary sends two plaintext-randomness pairs to be encrypted by participants not compromised in this phase to the challenger, then the challenger flips a random bit denoted as and returns the ciphertext of either input pair to the adversary according to the value of . The challenge action is always executed once in this sequence. The third phase is guess, in which the adversary guesses the value of from the ciphertext returned from the challenge action in the previous phase. We say that the adversary wins the game if he correctly guesses the value of . Interested readers may refer to [27] for more details of the game setup.
We now outline our proof-by-contradiction. We argue that in our protocol, the probability for the adversary to identify a disconnected component inside the network is low. It is because the only reliable means of identification is when a set of honest meters pick colluders exclusively as their neighbors, and they are not chosen as neighbors of any other honest meters outside of the set. Hence, the adversary is unlikely to find a disconnected component in which the shared keys cancel out and the added noise for DP is insufficient. Given this observation, the privacy protection of the protocol is then provided by modular addition.
By way of contradiction, we assume that there exists an approach for the adversary of the security game to differentiate, with significant probability, between the two encryption cases in the challenge phase of the game, and hence guess the value of correctly. The same approach can then differentiate between different values used in the modular addition with significant probability, which contradicts the perfect security proof in [4] . Hence, we conclude that it is impossible for the adversary to differentiate between the two encryption cases in the challenge phase and correctly guess the value of , i.e., our protocol, which makes use of modular addition, achieves aggregator obliviousness.
C. Secure Aggregation With Fault Tolerance
In this section, we present a secure proactive aggregation protocol with fault tolerance, using a novel design of future ciphertext buffering.
Future ciphertext buffering. Each smart meter sends two kinds of ciphertexts to the aggregator, namely current ciphertexts and future ciphertexts. The current ciphertext is given by where denotes . The future ciphertext is given by Note that is a Laplace noise generated solely by . We assume that the aggregator has a memory buffer so that it can store future ciphertexts per meter. In a time slot, each meter sends one current ciphertext and future ciphertexts . The purpose is for to always try to fill the aggregator's buffer with its future ciphertexts, as shown in Fig. 1 . Suppose, for example, that in time slot , the aggregator already has future ciphertexts: . Then, sends just two ciphertexts in : one current ciphertext and one future ciphertext . If the aggregator successfully receives the ciphertexts, it stores in its buffer. If fails in time slot , so it does not report in that round, then in the next time slot , it will try to send one current ciphertext and two future ciphertexts and . In steady-state normal operation (i.e., without failures), the protocol sends one current ciphertext and one future ciphertext per time slot. Hence, although it adds redundancy for proactive recovery, it is in fact more bandwidth efficient than the reactive protocol in [1] .
Note that current ciphertexts and future ciphertexts contain two random numbers in common:
and . Assume that in time slot , sends a future ciphertext . After time slots, will send a current ciphertext . If a current ciphertext and a future ciphertext contain the same , in is equal to in and in is equal to in . Buffer size requirements. Assume that electricity consumption measured by a smart meter is in watts (W), a 32-bit value, and reported in micro-watts , a 64-bit value, to approximate real noise, and the number of meters is . Then the modulus value for modular addition is , which means that the size of a future ciphertext is 84 bits. Therefore, if we assume that is , the total buffer size required for the future ciphertexts is or 10.5 GB. By the standard of today's consumer device technologies, it is a low memory requirement (e.g., portable terabyte disk drives sell at about US$50 per unit).
Decryption. In the case that the aggregator receives the current ciphertexts from all the meters, it can decrypt the sum using only the current ciphertexts:
If the aggregator fails to receive a current ciphertext from meter in time slot , it can use 's future ciphertext buffered to decrypt the sum. Particularly, if only one smart meter failed and did not report, the aggregator gets the sum as follows:
The aggregator will obtain the sum not including , and the accuracy degrades by as a result. In general, the aggregator is still able to calculate the sum when more meters fail, albeit at the cost of a larger error. Specifically, if smart meters failed, values of Laplace noise will remain. Therefore, the proposed protocol generates error when smart meters failed to report.
Join of new meter. Assume that a smart meter, say , joined the network before time slot . Therefore, has selected its partners and shared its shared keys with partner meters before . From time slot to , sends only future ciphertexts to the aggregator:
. Starting from time slot , sends both current and future ciphertexts. Let be a chosen partner of 's which accepts a new shared key from . Before time slot , uploads future ciphertexts in which the shared key with is not included. However, from time slot , starts to include the shared key with in its future ciphertexts. Therefore, the communication cost of supporting meter join is . Leave of existing meter. Suppose that decides to leave the network with effect in time slot . In time slot
, will have to inform the aggregator of its leave decision in advance, and the aggregator will broadcast a leave announcement message containing the id of and , denoted by . The leave decision of will affect two types of meters: those chosen by to be partners, and those who chose to be a partner. Let be a partner of 's (whether chose or was chosen by ). It shares a key with . Before time slot , will still use the shared key for its current ciphertext and any future ciphertexts before , but it will discard the key in and stop using it for future ciphertexts starting from that time slot.
Let be a smart meter which chose as a partner, and hence shares key with . When receives the leave notification about , it will need to find another partner to replace starting from time slot and maintain the number of meters it chooses to partner with at . Since there are at most smart meters, where is a constant and , which chose as a partner, at most meters will need to find another partner. Therefore, the total communication cost for meter leave is . Note that a meter, say , that failed will leave the system abruptly, without executing the proper procedure. In this case, the aggregator detects the failure after not hearing from for some time duration. It then initiates handling of the abrupt leave, by broadcasting a leave message on behalf of with set to the time slot of the last future ciphertext the aggregator has from .
D. Privacy Analysis of Proposed Secure Aggregation Protocol
Theorem 2: Our secure aggregation protocol with fault tolerance, which is shown in Fig. 2 , provides -DP if . Proof: To analyze the privacy of the protocol, the main task is to account for the information available in the future ciphertexts. To do so, suppose that based on the information it receives in the protocol, the aggregator performs queries on the data. The first query is on the entire dataset about all the meters. Let denote the set of smart meters that have failed. If is empty, the query result is , which satisfies -differential privacy. Otherwise, the aggregator obtains which satisfies -differential privacy as well, albeit with a larger error than in the case of no failures. We refer to the result of the first query as the primary result. The other queries are run on disjoint datasets, specifically one for each of the smart meters. A curious aggregator can abuse meter 's future ciphertext in time slot to infer , by computing even if it successfully received and should not have to use . By doing this, for each , the aggregator can calculate 's perturbed by , i.e., . Since the Laplace distribution has a symmetric shape about the mean zero, also provides -DP on data . We refer to the results of the queries as the sly results. The 's on which the queries are performed are disjoint datasets, Hence, -differential privacy is achieved by the parallel composition rule ( [20, Theorem 4] ). In time slot , from the perspective of meter , the two query results which contain satisfy -DP. As a result, by the sequential composition rule ( [20, Theorem 3] ), -DP is satisfied.
E. Error Optimization by Meter Failure Probability
The privacy budget of the proposed protocol is a sum of two parts, one given to the primary result and the other given to the sly results (see proof of Theorem 2). Assume that in each time slot, meters fail independently with probability . In this section, we describe how to reduce the errors of query results by optimizing the division of the DP budget given . For example, in the proof of Theorem 2, we divided the privacy budget equally between the primary result and the sly results, and achieved -DP overall. However, we can achieve the same -DP by a different division of the budget, for example, for the primary result and for the sly results. In general, for our fault-tolerant aggregation protocol to support -DP, the s.d. of noise needed is (1) where is the expected number of smart meters that failed to transmit. is the privacy share of the primary result and is that of the sly results, so that -DP is achieved overall. Note that the s.d. quantity (1) is in fact equal to the root mean square error (RMSE) of the per-period aggregation results. As such, it quantifies the overall error of the aggregation protocol.
The first term inside the square root of (1) is the variance of noise generated in a distributed manner to perturb the primary result, which depends on . The second term is the variance of noise introduced by the future ciphertexts of individual smart meters that failed, which depends on and . Intuitively, if is small, most of the time the aggregator successfully receives the current ciphertexts from all the meters, so that it can calculate the sum without any future ciphertexts. Hence, if we set larger approaching , the s.d. of noise becomes smaller. On the other hand, if is high, should be smaller to reduce the impact of the second term. The optimal for minimizing the s.d., which is the aggregation error, can be calculated given .
Notice that depending on the specific values of the variables , , and , it may be possible to further reduce the s.d. of noise by dividing the meters into smaller subgroups. For example, assuming smart meters are sorted in ascending order of their maximum power consumption, and the maximum power consumption of meter is given by , then there may exist a value such that i.e., dividing the original group into two reduces the s.d. of noise. The s.d. of noise may improve as we further divide the grouping of meters. However, there is no easy way to find the optimal solution of this group division problem. Although we can show that it is impossible to have a division with better s.d. of noise when non-consecutive meters in sorted order are grouped together (see Lemma 1) , and hence, the number of possible combinations is much reduced, the total number of possible divisions of meters is still . And we need to evaluate all of these possible divisions to find the optimal one.
Lemma 1: It is impossible to have a division with better s.d. of noise when we group non-consecutive meters in sorted order together.
Proof: We prove the lemma by contradiction. Let , , and be three smart meters with , where is the maximum possible load of household . We consider the case when the group of three meters is divided into two groups, then we have and , and , or and grouped together. Assuming that it is possible to have a division with better s.d. of noise when non-consecutive meters in sorted order are grouped together, i.e., we have and grouped together gives better s.d. of noise than we have and grouped together, then we have implying that , which contradicts the original assumption. Hence, it is impossible to have a division with better s.d. of noise when we group non-consecutive meters in sorted order together.
F. Error Reduction by Individual Sensitivity
As shown in (1), when is large, the noise for protecting the sly results dominates that for the primary result. In this section, we show that the noise for protecting the sly results can be further reduced using a notion of individual sensitivity.
Definition 2: (Individual sensitivity) The individual sensitivity of a smart meter, say , is the quantity where is the consumption data measured by in time slot . Hence, if measures the electricity consumption of a household, is the maximum amount that the household can consume in a time period. It is related to by (2) In the previous section, in order to perturb the sly results, every smart meter adopts the same system parameter, , to generate noise in the future ciphertexts. However, we can reduce the noise by replacing the in future ciphertexts by . The s.d. of noise is then given by (3) It is obvious that (3) is less than or equal to (1) due to (2) . Notice that the optimal in the individual sensitivity case will likely be different from that in the case using global sensitivity only. On the other hand, the use of individual sensitivity does not have other impacts on the protocol, such as its communication efficiency or encryption efficiency.
Theorem 3: Our fault-tolerant secure aggregation protocol based on individual sensitivity, shown in Fig. 3 , supports -DP, if and , where . Notice that the use of individual sensitivity also avoid the problem of finding the optimal division of meters to minimize the error, discussed in the previous section. It is because as we divide the original group into two, we introduce an additional term of while keeping the original term of for the primary result, and only reducing the value of the term associated with , i.e., the noise associated with sly results. The use of individual sensitivity ensures that the term associated with is minimized while having a single term only for the primary result. Hence, we cannot further divide the group to reduce the s.d. of noise. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 illustrate the reduction in error made possible by individual sensitivity based on real-world traces of electricity consumption. Fig. 4 shows a histogram of the maximum power 3 consumed by 22 households in the U.K. from January 2008 to December 2009 [25] . In the histogram, the largest value is 19,681W and the sum of all the maximum powers is 242,015W. If we take the largest of the maximum powers as the global sensitivity, and each maximum power itself as the individual sensitivity, then if the expected number of failed meters is one (i.e., ) and , we can obtain the ratio of (3) to (1) as:
Therefore, we can expect an 18% reduction in the aggregation error, by using individual sensitivity instead of global sensitivity. Fig. 5 shows a histogram of the maximum powers we recorded for 39 branches in the electricity network of the Advanced Digital Sciences Center (ADSC), Singapore, from May 28, 2012 to May 7, 2013 . The measurement interval is roughly two seconds and the largest measured value is 4,387W. In this setting, we can expect a 26% reduction in the aggregation error, which is more than the 18% in the U.K. household scenario. This is because at ADSC, one particular branch of the electricity network consumed a lot more than the other branches. In practice, it can be difficult for to estimate its own accurately beforehand. However, it is feasible to exploit individual sensitivity by grouping smart meters by, for example, the types of housing units (e.g., square footage, number of rooms, construction technology, etc, of residential flats) they belong to, and assign an individual sensitivity to each type. Once the smart meter is deployed long enough on field, it can replace the estimated with the more accurately measured one.
Our protocol requires the participants to use estimated parameters like global sensitivity (GS), individual sensitivity (IS), and failure rate. Participants could obtain these parameters from the utility initially, with IS updated later as discussed above. From the utility's point of view, failure rates are feasible to estimate. But it is harder for the utility to obtain the GS and IS because they concern customers' privacy, and accurate estimation could require privacy invasion. Rather, a customer could measure her own IS and report it to the utility. The utility might encourage this reporting by offering incentives. Based on the customer-reported IS values and approximations from other collected statistics, such as monthly power usage of a household and the total load at a substation, the utility can estimate the GS and the IS of each type of housing units. The utility can then forward these estimated GS and IS values, as well as failure rate of the smart meters, to all the participants.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate our aggregation protocol, we make use of a stateof-the-art generator for electricity traces [26] . The generator produces synthetic electricity consumption for one household at one minute resolution, based on realistic appliance and lighting models, over one specific day of the year (so that typical seasonal activities and weather conditions can be considered, for example). Based on it, we produce traces for 5,000 households. We specify the number of residents in each household using U.K. statistics on household sizes in 2011 [22] . We select the days to be a weekday in January, April, July, and October. For the appliances in a household, we choose them randomly among 33 available ones. For differential privacy, is set to 1 and the global sensitivity is set to 41 kW, which is the sum of power demands of all the appliances and lights. Each household also records its own individual sensitivity, which is the sum of power demands of its own appliances and lights. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate a trace of the actual total consumption and the noisy total consumption of 2,000 households for DP, from 7 pm to 8 pm on a weekday in January. The trace of actual sums is shown as the solid line in both figures. We run two separate simulations, corresponding to a low communication failure scenario and a high failure scenario , respectively 4 . Fig. 6 shows the traces when is 0.00001, and compares the three cases when , when , and when , respectively. The latter two values are the optimal that minimize the error according to our analysis (Section IV-E and Section IV-F, respectively). Fig. 7 shows the results when is set to 0.001. Because of more communication failures in this setting, the DP-induced noise is generally higher than in the case of in Fig. 6 .
A. Closeness Measures
We measure the closeness between the sequences of actual and noisy sums by root mean square error (RMSE) and mean relative error (MRE), i.e., where is the number of time slots in one day, is the noisy sum, and is the true sum. MRE measures the magnitude of error relative to the readings, while RMSE measures the magnitude of absolute error. MRE is more helpful for determining the accuracy of the reported readings, whereas RMSE tells us how much absolute noise is added by the protocol. Notice that the RMSE and MRE values reported in this section are averages of 1,000 simulation runs. Fig. 8 illustrates analytical results for the aggregation error when is 1 using traces for 2,000 households on a weekday in January, where is 41 kW. Fig. 8(a) shows the optimal values that minimize the error with respect to . We can observe from the figure that as the failure probability increases, the optimal drops to reduce the noise for the protection of the sly results. For instance, the optimal with global sensitivity decreases from 0.787 to 0.386 as the failure probability increases from 0.0001 to 0.002, while that with individual sensitivity decreases from 0.849 to 0.491. Fig. 8 (b) compares the aggregation errors for different when is fixed at 0.5, versus when the optimal values are applied with global sensitivity and individual sensitivity. The figure shows that using an arbitrary value always result in the worst RMSE performance, while using the optimal with individual sensitivity always has the best result. However, the relative performance of using arbitrary with individual sensitivity and using the optimal with global sensitivity depends heavily on the value of , the meter failure probability. For instance, when is small, using arbitrary with individual sensitivity performs as poorly as using arbitrary . On the other hand, when is large, the use of individual sensitivity, even with arbitrary , helps improve the RMSE performance significantly. It is because when is large, the contribution of noise from the sly results dominates the overall result. Since the use of individual sensitivity helps minimize the noise from the sly results, and thus, the overall RMSE is also minimized. Fig. 9(a) and (b) show the results when is 1,000 and 5,000, respectively. Together with Fig. 8(a) , we can observe that given the same , the optimal decreases as increases. It is because a larger results in larger number of meter failures, and hence, greater noise contributed from the protection of the sly results. In order to reduce noise, the optimal drops to give a heavier weight to the protection of the primary result. Fig . 10 shows the RMSE of the proposed aggregation protocol for different values with different sensitivity settings, using traces for 2,000 households on a weekday in January. Fig. 10(a) shows that for , the RMSE is 113,659 W when , whereas it is 80,610 W when is optimal with global sensitivity only (i.e., ), and it is 71,859 W when is optimal with individual sensitivity (i.e.,
). The optimal with global sensitivity provides a 29% reduction in RMSE compared with the fixed , and that with individual sensitivity provides a further 7.7% reduction in RMSE. . Individual sensitivity contributes to an approximately 27% reduction in the RMSE in this setting. Fig. 11 shows the MRE of the proposed aggregation protocol for different values, using traces for 2,000 households on a weekday in four different months. The figure shows that the MRE value is the highest in July, and the lowest in January. It is because among the four months simulated, the energy usage is the lowest in July and the highest in January, due to the general use of heater during winter and low usage of air-conditioner during summer in the U.K. As a result, with a similar magnitude of noise added because of similar number of meter failures in the four months, the higher the energy usage, the lower the MRE value.
C. Effects of Traces From Different Months
Notice that as RMSE does not depend on the total load, its value does not change when traces from different months of the year are used.
D. Comparisons With Another Fault-Tolerant Protocol
In this section, we compare our proposed protocol with another state-of-the-art fault-tolerant protocol, the proactive binary protocol [5] . We first compare the magnitude of noise introduced by the two protocols using simulations with different communication failure probabilities . We then implement the two protocols on a resource-constrained computation platform (TelosB motes) and compare the computation complexity of the two protocols.
Simulation results Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 illustrate a trace of the actual total consumption and the noisy total consumption of 2,000 households for DP, from 7 pm to 8 pm on a weekday in January. The trace of actual sums is shown as the solid line in both figures, the other two traces in each figure correspond to the noisy total consumption computed by our protocol under optimal and individual sensitivity, and a state-of-the-art proactive binary protocol [5] whose fault tolerance is the same as that of our protocol. We run two separate simulations, corresponding to a low communication failure scenario and a high failure scenario , respectively. Fig. 12 shows the traces when is 0.00001, while Fig. 13 shows the results when is 0.001. We can observe from the figures that the binary protocol adds significantly greater noise to the reported total consumption value, especially when is large. In particular, the noise added by the binary protocol can be so large that the resulting total consumption is negative in value. The noisy total consumption values computed by the binary protocol are so distorted from their actual values that make them practically useless to the aggregator.
Fig. 14 compares the RMSE of our protocol under optimal with individual sensitivity, with a state-of-the-art proactive binary protocol [5] whose fault tolerance is the same as that of our protocol. The figure shows that the binary protocol generates 9.4 times and 19.0 times larger RMSE than our protocol when is 0.00001 and 0.001, respectively, for 2,000 households. Our significantly improved accuracy is mainly because the amount of noise needed for privacy in our protocol does not depend on , whereas that of the binary protocol does (see Table I ). Fig. 15 shows the results when MRE is used to quantify the performance. Comparing Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 , we observe that as the number of households increases, RMSE increases as more meters are likely to fail and a greater magnitude of noise is added, while MRE decreases as the growth in number of households, and hence the total load, outweighs the growth of noise from the increased meter failures.
Experimental results
To evaluate the practical performance of our proposed protocol, we implemented it, as well as the binary protocol [5] , on TelosB motes. We picked the TelosB mote, a low-end sensor platform equipped with a low speed CPU (TI MSP430 F1161, 4 MHz) and running TinyOS 2.0, because it is similar in capability (e.g., computation and storage) to consumer-grade smart meters.
In our experiments, the size of electricity consumption data measured by a smart meter is set to 64 bits. Since the binary protocol requires modular exponentiation/multiplication, we utilize TinyECC [17] , which is a library for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). We select SECP192R1 for the elliptic curve parameters, and it provides a 1024-bit RSA security level with a 192-bit key length. Although NIST [21] recommends at least 224 bits for the key length, we use 192 bits since it is the maximum key length supported by TinyECC. In our protocol, six modular additions are required, namely three for the current ciphertext and three for the future ciphertext. In addition, two gamma random variables have to be generated for the current ciphertext, while two gamma random variables and one Laplace random variable have to be generated for the future ciphertext. In the case of the binary protocol, although only one geometric random variable has to be generated, two modular exponentiations and one modular multiplication must be computed by a smart meter per block. The number of blocks for a smart meter is due to the binary property. Fig. 16 . Time required for encryption and noise generation using the binary protocol [5] and the proposed aggregation protocol for different number of smart meters. Fig. 16 shows the time required by a smart meter for noise generation and encryption in the two algorithms. As shown in Fig. 16 , our protocol takes only approximately 322ms regardless of . On the other hand, the binary protocol takes 9.91 s when is one. The computation time for the binary protocol increases logarithmically as increases. When is 1024, 109.1 s are required by the binary protocol. The binary protocol consumes much more computation time than ours mainly due to the ECC operations. These results demonstrate the practical advantages of our protocol in terms of scalability and computation cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a fault-tolerant aggregation protocol for smart meters to report consumption to an untrusted aggregator with assured differential privacy. Our fault-tolerance approach is proactive and based on a novel design of future ciphertexts. We proved the differential privacy guarantee of our protocol. We also analyzed its communication complexity in normal operation and when meters join or leave. Although the proposed protocol distributes trust and noise for differential privacy among the meters, we showed that it can gracefully tolerate missing reports due to communication failures. Computational efficiency at the meters is assured by modular addition-based encryption.
Compared with a state-of-the-art proactive binary protocol [5] , our protocol has the same fault tolerance but it is much more bandwidth-efficient. Its aggregation error does not grow with the total number of meters, unlike the binary protocol. We presented minimization of the aggregation error based on the communication failure probability and a notion of individual sensitivity. Simulations driven by realistic energy traces showed that the error reduction in practice is significant. Compared with a state-of-the-art reactive protocol [1] , our protocol has similar bandwidth efficiency. More importantly, the reactive protocol will break when communication failures prevent encryption keys to cancel out in a three-message exchange process. These failures are quite possible in practical operation, but they will not affect the fault tolerance of our protocol.
